THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEFICIENCIES OF VIRGINIA\u27S  VILENESS  AGGRAVATING FACTOR by Falkner, Juliette A.
Capital Defense Journal
Volume 2 | Issue 1 Article 16
Fall 9-1-1989




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj
Part of the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Capital Defense Journal by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Juliette A. Falkner, THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEFICIENCIES OF VIRGINIA'S "VILENESS" AGGRAVATING FACTOR, 2 Cap. Def.
Dig. 19 (1989).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj/vol2/iss1/16
Capital Defense Digest - Page 19
Court held that the jury unanimously found the existence of both
predicates which justify the death penalty (future dangerousness and
vileness) even though only one was necessary to sustain the death
penalty. The court held that the jury's findings of future dangerous-
ness and vileness were supported by the evidence.
The court failed to address the constitutionality of the language
of the verdict form on its face. The wording of the verdict form
leaves open the possibility of the jury unanimously finding either
future dangerousness or vileness, but not unanimously agreeing as to
which predicate exists. The wording of the verdict form also leaves
open the possibility that a jury will unanimously find vileness but fail
to agree on the elements of the vileness: torture, depravity of mind, or
aggravated battery to the victim, each of which has been found
independently sufficient to support a death sentence.
ANALYSIS
The importance of Hoke to attorneys in Virginia may be seen in
several different issues. First, Hoke underscores the paramount
importance of preserving issues on the record at trial By failing to
object, the defense waived the right to raise three possibly meritori-
ous issues on appeal. The court preserved the verdict form issue by
ruling on it voluntarily. Defense counsel should be careful not to
summarily forfeit available objections just because the objection will
most probably be overruled, as illustrated by the verdict form issue.
Absent an objection, claims later determined by federal courts to be
meritorious will be lost.
Virginia attorneys should also learn from this case to assess their
cases as objectively as possible. The Virginia capital murder statute
seems to be narrowly drawn. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of
Virginia has construed the statute very broadly. In spite of testimony
of consensual sex followed by homicide, the court found evidence
sufficient to support rape. Hoke's ransacking of Stell's apartment
after murdering her was seen as sufficiently connected to the murder
to support a finding of guilt of murder during commission of robbery
while armed with a deadly weapon, again supporting a capital
conviction. The court also found that there was sufficient force
beyond that inherent in rape to support a conviction of abduction.
These findings should put Virginia defense attorneys on notice that
the capital murder statute will be construed very broadly.
Summary and analysis by: Kerry D. Lee
THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEFICIENCIES OF VIRGINIA'S "VILENESS" AGGRAVATING FACTOR
By: Juliette A. Falkner
I. As applied In Virginia the vileness predicate in Va. Code Ann.
§19.2-264.2 Is unconstitutional.
For an individual to receive a sentence of death in Virginia, the
jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt the probability that: 1) the
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing serious threat to society or; 2) that the
defendant's conduct in committing the offense was "outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture,
depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim." Va. Code
Ann. § 19.2-264.2 (1983). All of these requirements constitute the
"aggravating factors" of Virginia's death penalty scheme. The first
factor is known as the "future dangerousness" predicate. Facially,
future dangerousness is constitutional. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,
274, 96 S. Ct. 2950, 2957, 49 L. Ed. 2d 929, 940 (1988) (holding
Texas capital sentencing scheme which allowed a jury to consider
"future dangerousness" was not unconstitutional); Barefoot v. Estelle,
463 U.S. 880, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1090 (1983). The second
factor is known as the "vileness" predicate. On its face and as applied
in Virginia the "vileness predicate" in § 19.2-264 is unconstitutional.
See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, .... , 108 S. Ct. 1853,
1859, 100 L. Ed. 2d 372,381 (1988) (unless the trial court communi-
cates a limiting instruction to the jury regarding the meaning of
statutory "vileness factors," the jury's discretion is unguided);
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420,428, 100 S. Ct. 1759, 1765, 64 L.
Ed. 2d 398, 406 (1980) (standing alone the words "outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman" fail to limit the jury's discre-
tion).
The purpose of aggravating factors is twofold under the Sixth,
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. First, aggravating factors narrow the class of death
eligible defendants in a capital trial. Second, aggravating factors
channel the discretion of the jury to prevent the arbitrary and
capricious imposition of the death penalty:
[A]n aggravating circumstance must genuinely narrow the
class of persons elibible for the death penalty and must
reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence
on the defendant compared to others found guilty of
murder....[S]tatutory aggravating circumstances play a
constitutionally necessary function at the stage of legisla-
tive definition: they circumscribe the class of persons
eligible for the death penalty.
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877-78, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2742-44,77
L. Ed. 2d 235, 249-250 (1983); see also, Rosen, The "Especially
Heinous" Aggravating Circumstance in Capital Cases-The
Standardless Standard, 64 N.C.L. Rev. 978-79 (1986) (discussing the
general purpose of aggravating factors). Thus, guiding and limiting
the capital sentencer's discretion "so as to minimize the risk of
wholly arbitrary and capricious action' is a fundamental constitu-
tional requirement. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189, 96 S. Ct.
2909, 2940-41, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976); see also Maynard, 486 U.S.
at_ 108 S. Ct. at 1858. As applied in Virginia, the vileness
predicate in Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2 fails to fulfill this constitu-
tional requirement.
In Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. at 420, the judge instructed the
jury that a death sentence could be imposed if the jury found the
offense was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in
that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to
the Victim." Id. at 429. Based on this instruction, the jury sentenced
Godfrey to death. Id. The United States Supreme Court held "there is
nothing in these few words, standing alone that implied any inherent
restraint on the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death
sentence." Id.; see also, Maynard, 486 U.S. at_ 108 S. Ct. at
1853. The Maynard Court found that "especially heinous, atrocious
and cruel" means the same as "outrageously or wantonly vile,
horrible or inhuman" as used in Godfrey. Id. at_ . 108 S. Ct. 1859.
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Virginia's list of aggravating factors parallels the language
found unconstitutional in its application in Godfrey and Maynard. See
Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2. However, the Supreme Court's rulings
in Godfrey and Maynard also held that such factors may be Constitu-
tional if. 1) the state places a constitutionally acceptable limiting
construction on the term; Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 429; and 2) the judge
communicates this limiting construction to the jury. Id.; Mills v.
Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 108 S. CL 1860, 100 L. Ed. 2d. 384 (1988);
or 3) the reviewing court strikes down death sentences arbitrarily
imposed under this factor. The Supreme Court of Virginia insists that
§ 19.2-264.2 satisfies the above-mentioned criteria because the words
forming the vileness predicate have common meanings.
The Supreme Court of Virginia has held that "depravity of
mind" and "aggravated battery" have a common meaning and
provide the objective standards necessary to guide a jury's discretion.
Stockton v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 134-45, 314 S.E.2d 371,
378 (1984) (holding these terms do not give ajury "unbridled
discretion."); Clark v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 201,211,257 S.E.2d
784,790 (1979); see also, Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455,
478, 248 S.E.2d 135, 148-49 (1978). In Smith the court stated-
"...[W]e construe the words 'depravity of mind' as used
here to mean a degree of moral turpitude and psychical
debasement surpassing that inherent in the definition of
ordinary legal malice and premeditation. Contextually, we
construe the words 'aggravated battery' to mean a battery
which, qualitatively and quantitatively, is more culpable
than the minimum necessary to accomplish an act of
murder." Id.
A definition of these terms in ajury instruction was determined not to
be necessary. Clark, 220 Va. at 211,257 S.E.2d at 790. Such
reasoning is inconsistent with the rationale of Maynard and Godfrey
which held that these words standing alone failed to restrain the
"arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty." Godfrey,
420 U.S. at 428-29; see also Maynard, 486 U.S. at _, 108 S. Ct. at
1859.
Despite the assertion that these words standing alone have a
commonly accepted meaning, the Supreme Court of Virginia has
recognized that the "generally accepted" meanings of the words may
not be the best definitions. Clark, 420 Va. at 211,257 S.E.2d at 790.
For example, the trial judge in Clark allowed the defendant to submit
alternative definitions to the "accepted" meanings of these terms. Id.
The supreme court reasoned that the common definitions did not
mean "these definitions were the best or only ones possible." Id. It
should be noted that Clark's counsel failed to provide the court with
any alternative definitions. Id.
The court's assertion that there are better or alternative defini-
tions suggests that there is no generally accepted meaning of these
words. If "alternative" or "better" definitions exist, it is difficult to
say that understanding of their meaning is "common." Absent a clear
limiting definition of these words in each capital case the jury's
discretion is unguided. See Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428-29. Generally
Virginia trial courts give a jury no definition of these words. See
Clark, 420 Va. at 211,257 S.E.2d 790; see Va. Model Jury Instruc-
tion No. 34.120 (1988).
Consequently, Virginia's vileness predicate on its face and as
applied fails to guide the jury's discretion to prevent the arbitrary and
capricious infliction of the death penalty. Further, the Supreme Court
of Virginia fails to overturn death sentences based on these aggravat-
ing factors, even in cases where no limiting instruction is given. The
result is the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the Virginia death
penalty in violation of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights.
I. Lowenfleld v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 108 S. Ct. 546,57 L. Ed. 2d
335 (1988) fails to save Virginia's vileness factor.
InLowenfield, 484 U.S. at , 108 S. Ct. at 555, the defendant
objected to the Louisiana capital sentencing scheme. Louisiana's
scheme employs an intent "to kill or inflict great bodily harm upon
more than one person" as an element to be proven at the guilt phase
of a capital trial and as an aggravating factor to be proven at the
sentencing phase of a capital trial. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:30(A) (3)
(West 1986). 108 S. Ct. at 553-54. Lowenfield argued that Louisi-
ana's use of these factors to determine guilt and to aggravate capital
murder failed to narrow further the class of death eligible defendants
in the sentencing proceeding. Id.. The Supreme Court held-
"Petitioner's argument that the parallel nature of these provi-
sions requires that his sentences be set aside rests on a mistaken
premise as to the necessary role of aggravating circumstances. ...The
use of 'aggravating circumstances,' is not an end in itself, but a
means of genuinely narrowing the class of death-eligible persons and
thereby channeling the jury's discretion." 108 S. Ct. at 554.
The Court concluded that this "narrowing function" could be
performed during the guilt phase of a trial or the sentencing phase of
a trial. Id.. Using this reasoning, Louisiana's statute performed the
required "narrowing function" at the guilt phase. Id..
Similar to Louisiana, Virginia's capital punishment scheme
narrowly defmes those crimes eligible for the death sentence. Va.
Code Ann. § 18.2-31 (1988); but compare, Hoke v. Commonwealth,
237 Va. 303, 310-11, 377 S.E.2d 595, 603 (1989) (very broadly
construing three sections of the capital murder statute). Unlike
Louisiana, the Virginia legislature also requires a jury to make a
finding of specific aggravating factors, different from the elements of
the offense, before imposing a sentence of death. Va. Code Am. §
19.2-264.2. After the Supreme Court's decision in Lowenfield it is
unclear whether the United States Constitution requires Virginia to
have a separate list of aggravating factors.
There are three other meaningful distinctions between Louisi-
ana's capital punishment scheme and Virginia's capital punishment
scheme. First, the aggravating factors involved inLowenfield were
plainly Constitutional, even if duplicative of elements of the crime
charged. Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at , 108 S. CL 554. For the
reasons discussed earlier, Virginia's aggravating factors are not
constitutionally applied because they fail to guide the jury's discre-
tion according to the principles established by Maynard and Godfrey.
Second, prior Supreme Court decisions hold that aggravating factors
provide two purposes. The Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments require that aggravating factors narrow the class of death
eligible individuals; and aggravating factors must "justify" the
imposition of the death penalty and "channel" the discretion of the
jury to prevent the arbitrary and capricious application of the death
penalty. See Supra. Third, Virginia has chosen to have aggravating
factors. Even though the law may no longer require such factors,
Virginia gave capital defendants a statutory right to have their
sentencers consider these factors in a meaningful manner under the
constitution. Virginia cannot apply this state created right arbitrarily
and capriciously.
In Turner v. Murray, the United States Supreme Court recog-
nized that Virginia's statute gave capital defendants the right to have
the jury impose a death sentence only after considering the aggravat-
ing factors listed in § 19.2-264.2. Turner v., Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 34,
106 S. Ct. 1683, 1687, 90 L. Ed. 2d 27, 35 (1986). A state created
right entitles an individual to Due Process protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,414-16, 106 S. CL 2595,91 L. Ed. 2d
335, 349-50 (1985) (holding that a state created right may not violate
the due process requirements of the Constitution). "A person's liberty
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is equally protected even when the liberty itself is a statutory creation
of the State. The Touchstone of Due Process is protection of the
individual against arbitrary action of government." Wolffv. McDon-
nell, 418 U.S. 539, 558, 94 S. Ct 2963, 2976, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935, 952,
citing, Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 123, 9 S. Ct. 231,233, 32
L. Ed. 2d 623, 626 (1889). Thus Virginia has a constitutional duty to
protect against the arbitrary and capricious application of the
aggravating factors in § 19.2-264.2 by the sentencing body.
The irreversible nature of the death penalty makes it even more
imperative that the accused be protected from arbitrary action of the
government See, Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S. Ct. 2529,
96 L. Ed. 2d 944 (1987) (holding the "unique nature of the death
penalty required additional protection during pretrial, guilt and
sentencing phases); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). Hence, the "...
Constitution places special constraints on the procedures used to
convict an accused of a capital offense and sentence him to death."
Murray v. Giarrantano, 109 S. Ct. 2765, 106 L. Ed. 2d. 713 (1989);
See also, Beck v.Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S. Ct. 2382, 65 L. Ed.
2d 392 (1980) (trial judge must give jury the option to convict of a
lesser offense; Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (jury must be allowed to
consider all of a capital defendant's mitigating evidence). Therefore
the severe and irreversible nature of the death penalty requires
Virginia judges and attorneys to guide and limit the sentencers'
discretion in applying the "vileness factors."
Whether Virginia's "vileness factors" are a federal requirement
or a matter of state legislative choice, these factors are unconstitu-
tional as applied in Virginia.
Restrictions on the State's Use of Mental Health
Experts in Capital Trials
W. Lawrence Fitch, J.D.
Director, Forensic Evaluation Training and Research
Institute of Law, Psychiatry and Public Policy
University of Virginia School of Law
There has been some question in recent years whether/under
what circumstances the prosecution in a capital murder trial might
use psychiatric' testimony to support its case at the penalty phase that
the defendant should receive the death penalty. To the casual
observer, it might appear that the matter was resolved by the United
States Supreme Court in its 1983 opinion in Barefoot v. Estelle. 2 It
was not, however.
Barefoot concerned psychiatric testimony given in response to
hypothetical questions posed by the prosecution at the penalty phase
of defendant Thomas Barefoot's capital murder trial in Texas.
Neither of the psychiatrists who appeared for the state had personally
examined Barefoot, yet both testified that, assuming the truth of the
statements contained in the prosecution's hypotheticals, Barefoot was
a "sociopath" who was not amenable to treatment and who would
commit acts of violence in the future if given a chance. Under Texas
law at that time, the trier of fact was required to impose the death
penalty on a finding of two aggravating factors: (1) that the defendant
killed deliberately, and (2) that the defendant would probably commit
further acts of violence in the future.
Barefoot was sentenced to death. On appeal, he argued that,
given (1) the law's heightened concern for reliability in capital case
decision-making and (2) the patent unreliability of psychiatric
dangerousness prediction-an unreliability well-documented in the
psychiatric literature3 and forcefully attested to by the American
Psychiatric Association in its amicus brief in his case-the state's
introduction of psychiatric testimony on the question of his danger-
ousness violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution. The Supreme Court, however, was not impressed.
Writing for the majority, Justice White observed, "[i]f it is not
impossible for even a lay person sensibly to arrive at that conclusion
[that a defendant is dangerous], it makes little sense, if any, to
suggest that psychiatrists, out of the entire universe of persons who
might have an opinion on the issue, would know so little about the
subject that they should not be permitted to testify." Justice White
suggested that concerns about the unreliability of prediction testi-
mony properly go to the weight to be accorded such testimony, not to
its admissibility: "We are unconvinced.., that the adversary process
cannot be trusted to sort out the reliable from the unreliable evidence
and opinion about future dangerousness ....
The opinion of the Court in Barefoot, of course, was concerned
solely with questions of constitutional law. The Court did not resolve
whether the psychiatrists' testimony satisfied the requirements of
Texas law governing the admissibility of expert opinion testimony.
Thus, while perhaps not constitutionally objectionable, psychiatric
testimony on the question of future dangerousness might be objec-
tionable on state evidence law grounds. Certainly in any state that
recognizes the Frye 'test for the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence-a test requiring not only that the witness have specialized
knowledge or skills "beyond the ken of the lay person" but also that
the subject matter of the testimony have gained general acceptance in
the scientific community-psychiatric predictions of future violence
would be highly suspect. Even in Virginia, where the Frye test
recently was rejected in favor of a test speaking more generally in
terms of "reliability,"6 a good argument can be made that dangerous-
ness predictions should be excluded. There can be no guarantee of
that such an argument will prevail in a given case, however. Indeed,
as a matter of practice, psychiatric predictions of future dangerous-
ness are heard in courtrooms every day.
8
Fortunately, it should rarely be necessary to resort to the
evidentiary objection when the prosecution offers psychiatric
evidence in aggravation. Indeed, in the usual case--one in which the
psychiatrist's opinion is based on a personal examination of the
defendant-a winning objection ordinarily can be made on Fifth,
Sixth, or Fourteenth Amendment grounds, or, in Virginia, on
statutory grounds.
The United States Supreme Court recognized in Estelle v. Smith
that Fifth Amendment protection must be accorded a defendant at the
penalty phase of a capital trial. The defendant in Estelle was
sentenced to death on the strength of a psychiatrist's prediction that
he would be violent in the future if permitted to live. The psychia-
trist's opinion was based on an evaluation he performed prior to trial
to assess the defendant's competency to stand trial. The psychiatrist
did not warn the defendant that the evaluation might be used to
address the issue of future dangerousness. Declaring the psychia-
